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The early 1980s in South Africa was a period still marked by 
apartheid politics, which made clear restrictions on art as well 
as on many other aspects of life. In such a heated context, 
artists and writers were often important figures in the 
resistance against state power and were expected by readers 
and critics to take clear political stances against the state and 
its inhumane politics. 
The logic of literary 
politics—influenced by 
literary existentialism—
followed the schema 
according to which the 
author “opposes 
apartheid through 
exposing it” 
(Bethlehem 367).1 A 
part of such a logic involved seeing the author as residing on 
the side of truth, whereas the state was inherently seen as 
corrupted. J. M. Coetzee‟s notion of a writer‟s situation in 
society, on the contrary, complicates this existentialist notion 
of a writer‟s duty to act against the repressive state, a notion 
shared by many of his contemporary South African authors 
during the era of apartheid politics. Coetzee‟s essays on 
censorship call into question the presupposition of a 
relationship between a truthful author and a lying state, and 
characterize a contagious logic informing the relationship 
between the two. In his essays, Coetzee disputes the 
straightforward politics informing committed art in the 
                                                 
1 South African literary politics after the 1960s was indebted to 
existentialism. Paul Rich writes: “Already avant-garde Afrikaans literary 
circles via the Sestigers had, in the early 1960s, begun the exploration 
towards a version of literary existentialism, stimulated by such writers 
as Samuel Beckett, Jean Paul Sartre and Eugene Ionesco. The effect of 
this, so Andre Brink claimed, was to escalate the decolonising process in 
South African literature despite the European origins of these writers” 
(Rich, “Tradition and Revolt” 55). See also Richard Peck‟s “Condemned 
to Choose, But What? Existentialism in Selected Works by Fugard, Brink, 
and Gordimer.” 
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context of apartheid politics and moves toward the notion of 
autonomous art as a potential way of criticizing the state in a 
more sustained manner. The aim of this article is to introduce 
briefly some of the more prominent aspects of these complex 
questions regarding the interplay of art and politics in the 
context of the South African literary discourse in the early 
1980s.2 I explore South African resistance literature and, 
more particularly, André Brink‟s ideas and his commitment to 
political struggle vis-à-vis Jean-Paul Sartre‟s notion of 
politically committed art. I read Coetzee‟s challenge to 
resistance literature as a response with striking similarities to 
Theodor Adorno‟s criticism of committed art, which Adorno 
levelled at Sartre in his two-part essay “On Commitment.” As 
both Coetzee and Adorno demonstrate, committed art 
remains close to the power it criticizes, and does not break 
free from it. Coetzee maintains that it is the constant task of 
the writer to resist the binaristic logic of the state by avoiding 
the lure of self-deception and maintaining an awareness that 
he, too, is implicated in state violence. 
Existentialism, which arose in France under Nazi occupation, 
has been an appealing philosophy for writers and intellectuals 
                                                 
2 In various analyses of state politics, the questions of lying and politics 
are often seen in close proximity to one another. Hannah Arendt, in 
“Truth and Politics,” establishes a firm relationship between the realm of 
politics and the act of lying. She writes: “No one has ever doubted that 
truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, 
as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political 
virtues” (Between Past and Future 227). In Crises of the Republic, she 
further claims that secrecy “and deception, the deliberate falsehood and 
the outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends, have 
been with us since the beginning of recorded history” (4). In his essay 
on Hannah Arendt, "History of the Lie: Prolegomena," Jacques Derrida 
maintains that political history as well as any history would not be 
possible without at least the possibility of the lie, as he writes that 
“there would be no history in general, and no political history in 
particular, without at least the possibility of lying, that is, of freedom 
and of action” (“History of the Lie” 155). Thus, in the words of Joseph 
Kronick, “truth remains bound to its spectral relationship with the lie” 
(1002). In this essay I also want to examine how these two terms, 
truth-speaking and lying, often remain in close proximity to one another 
rather than forming mutually exclusive polarities. 
 127 
Pivot 1.1 
under similarly oppressive circumstances. In 1992, Richard 
Peck argued that “existentialism maintains an extraordinary 
grip over white South African dissident writers” (67).3 He 
further maintained that “[t]he resonance of this philosophy 
with the author's own ideas generally derives from a sense of 
historical correspondence” (68). Existentialism‟s emphasis on 
action provides the author with a sense of agency in a 
tyrannical state. For instance, it was the French political 
situation, and particularly the Algerian war (1954-62), that 
made a permanent impression on young Brink‟s mind, and in 
an interview with Bahgat Elnadi and Adel Rifaat, he credits 
existentialist author Albert Camus as the writer who triggered 
a change in his own political views: “I was in Paris at the time 
of the Algerian war and all the problems it caused in France, 
the time when Camus was writing about the pieds noirs, the 
French settlers in Algeria” (5). For Brink, French occupation of 
Algeria had political correlations with the white settlement in 
South Africa. In similar fashion, Peck maintains that 
existentialist philosophy has appealed to white South African 
dissident authors because of the country‟s “state of almost 
perpetual crisis … [v]irtually all of Brink's and [Nadine] 
Gordimer's recent novels are set within this crisis” (69-70). 
The existentialist author is bound to act. For engaged 
authors—who take their responsibility seriously and wish to 
initiate change in the world—action takes the form of writing. 
Sartre writes in What is Literature? (1949) that “[t]he 
„engaged‟ writer knows that words are action. He knows that 
to reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by 
planning to change” (23). Sartre further claims that “the 
function of the writer is to act in such a way that nobody can 
be ignorant of the world and that nobody may say that he is 
innocent of what it‟s all about” (24). In the context of 
                                                 
3 The writers whose works he has selected to explore in his article are 
André Brink, Athol Fugard, and Nadine Gordimer. 
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apartheid politics in South Africa various literary critics took a 
similar stance on the function of literature. Leon de Kock, for 
instance, emphasizes the writers‟ desire “to reveal the lie 
behind the moral sanctimony of separate development” 
(230).4 This concern is shared by Sarah Christie, Geoffrey 
Hutchings, and Don Maclennan, who maintain that the power 
of South African literature “comes from knowledge, and from 
deep concern for social and political change. The crime, for a 
writer of this group is to be in any way escapist, not 
committed to the greater human cause…. Consequently most 
of this writing is by intention critical and protesting, for its 
main function is to present the truth and the truth is seldom 
pleasant” (99). 
Brink is one of the South African authors whose ideas are 
very clearly related to existentialism, and who was very 
persistent in his fight against the repressive state system.5 In 
his introduction to the collection of essays titled Writing in a 
State of Siege (1983), he distinguishes his own position as a 
writer in the following manner: “There lies a peculiar 
satisfaction in countering the tactics of secrecy with 
exposure: the dark fears nothing quite so much as light” 
(35). Although Brink denies being affected by Sartre‟s work, 
it is apparent that his thinking is influenced by Sartre‟s 
philosophy of art.6 This becomes clear in his introduction, in 
which Brink discusses the reasons he wants to remain in 
                                                 
4 As Bethlehem points out, separate development is a well-known “state 
euphemism for apartheid” (368). 
5 According to Peck, “[t]he existentialism that pervades the fictional 
work of … André Brink, is most obvious in The Wall of the Plague 
(1984)” (67). 
6 In an interview conducted by Bahgat Elnadi and Adel Rifaat, Brink 
answers their question, “Were you influenced by Sartre?” in the 
following manner: “Not much. I read Sartre before I read Camus. 
Intellectually, I admired Sartre very much. But Camus bowled me over, 
emotionally and morally. Sartre affected me intellectually, but that was 
all” (5). See also Isidore Diala‟s article “André Brink and Malraux.” 
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South Africa by using such Sartrean terms as “being in 
situation.” Brink writes:  
In the fullest sense of the word [this] is an experience of 
being in situation. Which is something radically different 
from „being within the system‟! In fact, only by being not 
only in situation but, if it is at all possible, sur place, can 
one make sure that the system is exposed, countered 
and eventually shattered. (35) 
It is Brink‟s political obligation to reveal and expose the 
apartheid system and use his writing as action in the world. 
Brink acknowledges that as beings in situation we are 
challenged to transcend our historical circumstances. This is 
why we are bound to be free. We are free to choose. Brink 
further states that  
the system is [to be] exposed … in the name of that 
truth all writers go in search of, that freedom which can 
only be born from the rebellion against unfreedom, and 
that justice of which as a barefoot boy I caught a 
glimpse that can never fade—provided one commit 
oneself unconditionally to the need to state it, and 
restate it, and state it again, and again, and forever. 
(35) 
For the committed author the concept of freedom originates 
from choice. Brink‟s writing bears much in common with other 
existentialist writing, which, according to Peck, emphasizes 
the necessity to act: “one is free to choose, and indeed 
condemned to such freedom; therefore one defines oneself by 
action, and good faith would seem to demand forms of action 
that are capable of enlarging human life and freedom” (73). 
For the writer, freedom and the choice it involves entail the 
action of committed writing, a critical act aimed at enabling 
other subjects to reflect critically on and actively challenge 
their own unfreedom. 
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In Theodor Adorno‟s critical discussion of political 
commitment in art, Adorno challenges representational 
strategies that attempt to directly reflect social conditions 
without complicating the relation between forms of art and 
reality. Adorno‟s critique is useful in relation to the discussion 
of resistance literature in the South African context. Brink‟s 
notion of the role of the artist who goes against unfreedom in 
his writing in order to reveal social ills becomes complicated if 
we follow Adorno‟s criticism of Sartre‟s concept of committed 
art.7 For Adorno, committed art is not free and it does not 
arise from the freedom of choice; rather, such art is bound to 
remain consigned to the logic of the society it wishes to 
critique. Adorno writes that “[t]he notion of a „message‟ in 
art, even when politically radical, already contains an 
accommodation to the world” (“On Commitment II” 65). 
Furthermore, he states that “works of art that react against 
empirical reality obey the forces of that reality” (“On 
Commitment II” 62). Such forms of art make compromises, 
as they fail to break free from the empirical reality in which 
they originate (“On Commitment II” 62). For Adorno, art is 
not to mime empirical reality, but to follow its own rules of 
creation.8  
                                                 
7 Sartre‟s understanding of committed art has since received a lot of 
criticism for compromising its artistic forms, but it was not really 
challenged before Adorno‟s two-part essay “On Commitment.” In 
support of Sartre‟s position on engaged art, Robert Pickering writes in 
his article “Témoignage and Engagement in Sartre‟s War-Time Writings” 
that “literary values alone were never conceived to be the fundamental 
grounding of Resistance writing, attuned as it is to a complex 
intermeshing of political and ideological preoccupations, and to their 
relationships with cultural dissemination and advancement” (309). 
8 Without explicitly referring to Adorno‟s reading of Sartre, both Benita 
Parry and Louise Bethlehem raise similar concerns in their analysis of 
the South African resistance literature. Louise Bethlehem remains critical 
of the given relationship between art and “reality” in South African 
literary discourse. She states that “[w]riters and readers collectively 
assume that literature and life in South Africa maintain a mimetic or 
one-to-one relationship, that writing provides a supposedly unmediated 
access to the real” (366). Bethlehem clarifies this standpoint by stating 
that “[d]iscussions of literary function and value in South African 
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Like Adorno, Coetzee claims committed art remains in too 
close a proximity to the reality it wishes to criticize. In other 
words, its reaction to the world is dictated by its 
accommodation of that world. When analyzing literary 
depictions of torture in fiction, in his article “Into the Dark 
Chamber,” Coetzee develops this thought:  
For the writer the deeper problem is not to allow himself 
to be impaled on the dilemma proposed by the state, 
namely, either to ignore its obscenities or else to 
produce representations of them. The true challenge is: 
how not to play the game by the rules of the state, how 
to establish one‟s own authority. (Doubling 364, italics in 
the original)  
In other words, if the author reacts to the state‟s obscenities, 
like torture, by trying to reveal them in his or her fiction, it is 
self-deceptive to think that this writer is “free.” Rather, in the 
end, his or her reactions are dictated by the same state 
violence. Coetzee has, throughout his literary career, 
                                                                                                    
literature in English … are refracted through an elaborate rhetoric of 
urgency that strains to effect a secular closure between the word and 
the world precisely to safeguard the ethical claims of South African 
literary culture” (368). Therefore, in order to remain ethical, literary 
style cannot complicate the relationship between the sign and its 
referent—the word and the world. Such an approach assumes that 
ethical work is only possible through the modes of mimetic writing. 
This approach further implies that non-mimetic writing is somewhat 
apolitical. It follows that any author swaying from mimetic writing and 
from clearly stated political standpoints—i.e. not overtly enough 
positioning him/herself against the regime in power—is accused of 
apolitical, escapist and often reductionist writing. Such readings of 
literature are supported by Mothobu Mutloatse, for instance, who argues 
that “any writing which ignores the urgency of political events will be 
irrelevant” (qtd. in Seroke, 305. See also Bethlehem 367). 
In its emphasis on mimetic realism, as Benita Parry has noted, such an 
approach “acts to exercise a constraint on literary production” (13). 
Parry continues to state that “oppositional discourses quickening 
liberation energies can reside in spaces where there is no obvious 
correspondence between image and social message, and in articulations 
which do not register a literal relationship of word to social referent” 
(13). 
 132 
“A dynamic of blaming and counterblaming” 
struggled with this trying task of establishing one‟s own 
authority in a society rife with state violence. He identifies 
this persistent problem in his own writing as well as in 
Brink‟s. Coetzee‟s essays further emphasize the need to avoid 
the lure of self-deception in one‟s writing, and the need to 
examine the ways in which state power does substantial 
damage to any author‟s freedom. 
Both Sartre and Adorno were troubled by state violence in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, but Adorno strongly 
disagrees with Sartre‟s idea of committed art, which would 
teach its audience about the horrors of the world and at the 
same time imperil its own aesthetic form.9 According to 
Adorno, art cannot function as a mere vocalization of political 
values, since it has its own formal rules to follow.10 Adorno 
also expects art to be political, but he proposes that it can be 
political only by taking its distance from reality and by 
avoiding any direct reflection of political realities. In “On 
Commitment II,” Adorno claims:  
I have no wish to soften the saying that to write lyric 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric; it expresses in 
negative form the impulse which inspires committed 
literature. The question asked by a character in Sartre's 
play Morts Sans Sepulture, “Is there any meaning in life 
when men exist who beat people until the bones break in 
their bodies?” is also the question whether any art now 
                                                 
9Adorno criticizes Sartre‟s idea of committed art: “In order to develop 
his [Sartre‟s] drama and novel beyond sheer declaration—whose 
recurrent model is the scream of the tortured—Sartre has to seek 
recourse in a flat objectivity, subtracted from any dialectic of form and 
expression, that is simply a communication of his own philosophy. The 
content of his art becomes philosophy” (“On Commitment I” 8). 
10This, nevertheless, does not mean that art is not “social.” In the 
opening pages of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno claims that art should be 
both autonomous and fait social; it does this by resisting polemicizing 
and, through its form, making its relationship with society legible. 
Adorno writes: “The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks 
as immanent problems of form. This, not the insertion of objective 
elements, defines the relation of art to society” (6). 
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has a right to exist; whether intellectual regression is not 
inherent in the concept of committed literature because 
of the regression of society. (60-61)11 
The last sentence is particularly important here. According to 
Adorno, art can only live up to its role in society by refusing 
to relinquish its own formal rules. Committed literature and 
intellectual regression are characteristics of a society that has 
not reached its fullest potential; committed literature does 
not help the victims but rather leads society into a more 
regressed state.  
Coetzee‟s and Adorno‟s understandings of the relation 
between art and politics, even if arising from different 
politico-historical contexts, have much in common. Sam 
Durrant, who also reads Coetzee‟s work in relation to 
Adorno‟s discussion of literature and art, maintains that 
Adorno‟s 1962 essay “On Commitment” “sheds a crucial light 
on Coetzee‟s insistence on the autonomy of art” (“Bearing 
Witness” 433). Yet Coetzee—who refuses to follow the path of 
committed literature and who was during the 1980s often 
                                                 
11Adorno has stated various times that “Cultural criticism finds itself 
faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To 
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Prisms 34). Thus, art after the 
Holocaust could not be the same; it had to be reconfigured. The term 
“lyric poetry” can be interpreted here as a relatively wide concept 
including literary representations that seek to represent mimetically the 
Holocaust by sympathizing with the victims, and thereby domesticating 
the horror of the event and creating a consumable pathos. 
In his essay “The Modernist Event,” Hayden White also writes about 
representations of the Holocaust in the following manner: “With respect 
to the question of how most responsibly to represent the Holocaust, the 
most extreme position is … [that of] those who hold that this event is of 
such a kind as to escape the grasp of any language even to describe it 
and of any medium―verbal, visual, oral, or gestural―to represent it, 
much less of any merely historical account adequately to explain it” (30, 
italics in the original). Therefore, a disaster like the Holocaust goes 
beyond any form of representation; it can neither be explained nor 
comprehended. White broadens his discussion beyond the specific 
context of the Holocaust to suggest that “modernist techniques of 
representation provide the possibility of de-fetishizing both events and 
the fantasy accounts of them which deny the threat they pose, in the 
very process of pretending to represent them realistically” (32). 
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strongly criticized for doing so—at the same time maintains 
that remaining an independent thinker in such circumstances 
is profoundly difficult.12 Rather than firmly establishing truths 
in such a violent context as the South African apartheid 
regime, Coetzee has continually stated that its environment 
confuses and overwhelms him. He writes:  
Let me add, entirely parenthetically, that I as a person, 
as a personality, am overwhelmed, that my thinking is 
thrown into confusion and helplessness, by the fact of 
suffering in the world, and not only human suffering. 
These fictional constructions of mine are paltry, ludicrous 
defenses against that being-overwhelmed, and, to me, 
transparently so. (Doubling 248, italics in the original)13 
                                                 
12Coetzee‟s literary style, which avoids mimetic realism, the main 
representational strategy associated with “resistance literature” of the 
1980s, has received much criticism in the context of South African 
literary politics, a politics which sought to expose the truths of a 
corrupted society. Coetzee‟s anti-mimetic writing was strongly criticized 
for its perceived ahistoricism, particularly by Abdul R. JanMohamed in 
his article “The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial 
Difference in Colonialist Literature” and Paul Rich in his article “Apartheid 
and the Decline of the Civilization Idea.” Since then, some critics, 
including David Attwell, “have endeavored to rehistoricize Coetzee‟s 
fiction by emphasizing its discursive relevance to the time and place in 
which the novels were produced” (Durrant, “Bearing Witness” 431). Re-
historicizing Coetzee‟s work nevertheless runs a risk of failing to do 
justice to his ambiguous style. Attwell has also acknowledged this and 
states that the attempt to take Coetzee‟s books “back into their context” 
means also reading them “against the grain” (“Editor‟s Introduction” 8). 
This attempt to re-historicize Coetzee‟s work also indicates a partial 
acceptance of criticism that sees his work as ahistorical. My reading of 
Coetzee‟s fiction is more aligned with Durrant‟s analysis, as he maintains 
that “Coetzee's commitment to the autonomy of his art is precisely that 
which ensures the political force of his novels, that his novels are only 
able to engage with the history of apartheid precisely by keeping their 
distance” (“Bearing Witness” 432). 
13 In an interview with David Attwell, Coetzee states: “I am not a herald 
of community or anything else, as you correctly recognize. I am 
someone who has intimations of freedom (as every chained prisoner 
has) and constructs representations—which are shadows themselves—of 
people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light” 
(Doubling 341). Coetzee, unlike Brink, does not see writers as free 
subjects able to choose. Rather than seeing an apartheid society as 
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Whereas Brink sees South African society providing him with 
a strong “experience of being in situation” (35, italics in the 
original) and challenging him to transcend his historical 
circumstances, the same society confuses Coetzee, whose 
writing is not aimed at the exposure of state violence in the 
same sense. Instead, Coetzee‟s interest is to examine how 
this violence has affected him, and in turn, every citizen 
living in apartheid society. Coetzee‟s argument remains that 
authors cannot remain outsiders, calmly diagnosing the evils 
of society, because their thinking is contaminated by abuses 
of state power in a context marked by the “pervasive 
intrusiveness of totalitarian violence” in which no one—
including writers—can claim a position that remains 
untouched by such violence (Attwell, J.M. Coetzee 97). 
Coetzee has come back to this issue at various points in his 
career. For instance, in his Jerusalem Prize Acceptance 
Speech, he maintains that this violent social structure has 
distorted any “normal” human relations: 
The deformed and stunted relations between human 
beings that were created under colonialism and 
exacerbated under what is loosely called apartheid have 
their psychic representation in a deformed and stunted 
inner life. All expressions of that inner life, no matter 
how intense, no matter how pierced with exultation or 
despair, suffer from the same stuntedness and 
deformity. I make this observation with due deliberation, 
and in the fullest awareness that it applies to myself and 
my own writing as much as to anyone else. (Doubling 
98) 
In the context of South African apartheid politics, Coetzee 
suggests, it is very difficult to establish the authority of one‟s 
own position as a writer. This becomes all the more clear 
                                                                                                    
challenging him to act, he finds his role in such a society a disabling 
position. 
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when he writes about censorship, an extreme form of a 
restricting politics exercised by the state.14 
The antagonism between dissident authors and state politics 
becomes particularly heated in the context of discussions 
regarding censorship. In response, Brink, who is committed 
to exposing state violence, maintains that “unless [the 
authorities] are prepared to change, they must stand warned 
that we shall go all the way, always at least one step ahead, 
in making sure that their lies are exposed, that reality is not 
distorted, that truth will prevail” (194). Brink sees no 
ambiguity in the writer‟s role: the writer resides on the side 
of truth, ready to expose the lies told by state authorities. 
Nevertheless, Coetzee‟s understanding of verity remains 
different. 
This discussion of censorship resembles the earlier discussion 
of the dissident author trying to reveal state obscenities in his 
or her politically committed literature. Even if the author 
thinks that in the name of freedom he or she goes against the 
state by exposing the violence in his or her art, Coetzee 
maintains that the writer‟s artistic reactions are eventually 
dictated by the same state violence. Similarly, when 
discussing state censorship, the rules are once again created 
by the state, and the author should be wary of this logic.  
Coetzee identifies a fraught relationship between the 
“repressive state” and the writer fighting against it. This 
binaristic relation between the state and the writer is created 
by the logic of censorship, which Coetzee characterizes as a 
contagious discourse. He explains: “The further we explore 
the phenomenon of censorship, the more pivotal we find 
attribution to be, specifically the attribution of blame, and the 
dynamic that blaming initiates, a dynamic of blaming and 
                                                 
14He has written a collection of essays on the topic titled Giving Offense: 
Essays on Censorship (1996), which also includes his essay on Brink 
titled “The Politics of Dissident: André Brink.” 
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counterblaming” (Doubling 328). Coetzee maintains that “it is 
hard not to be sucked into this dynamic [of blaming], 
impossible not to be touched by it: those who claim to 
observe it judiciously or scientifically may be the most 
deceived” (Doubling 328). If the state is seen as a corrupted 
entity against which the truthful author is fighting, then the 
author suffers from self-deception if she or he is not aware of 
this contagious “dynamic of blaming and counterblaming” he 
or she is also necessarily taking part in (Doubling 328). The 
author risks losing his or her own authority in this situation. 
It is an infectious logic from which there seems to be no 
escape, unless the author takes his or her distance and 
establishes the rules of his or her own artistic representation. 
If the state becomes essentially antagonistic, an entity that is 
necessarily corrupted, this anti-state position entails risking a 
continuation of the contagious discourse: i.e. when the state 
blames me, I will blame it back. In his essay titled “The 
Politics of Dissident: André Brink,” Coetzee writes of Brink‟s 
clear-cut analysis of the truthful writer facing the corrupted 
state in the following way: “The writer tries to tell his truth 
and the state tries to stifle him; or the state offers seductions 
to which the writer either succumbs or replies with a truth-
affirming No” (Giving Offense 205). Nevertheless, according 
to Coetzee, these accusations regarding the antagonist, i.e. 
the state, situate in advance its potential 
response outside rational discourse. To the extent that 
they close off the entry of the antagonist into dialogue, 
they predict and indeed invite retaliatory violence, which 
in turn acts as a confirmation of their diagnostic truth. 
Much the same can be said about accusations of lying 
when lying is treated not as a trick or scheme or strategy 
of disputation but as the manifestation of an evil 
essence, the essence of power itself. (Giving Offense 
212) 
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This position entails the end of dialogue, and the continuation 
of retaliatory violence. The infectious logic of censorship 
remains unchallenged. This logic lures in everyone—Coetzee 
included. He is painfully aware of a contagious discourse or a 
paranoid logic of censorship when he notes that he, like 
anyone else, cannot escape this logic: “As I place it 
[censorship] under suspicion of hiding its true nature, of 
being a paranoid act, my criticism itself cannot escape from 
the paranoid dynamic of judging, blaming, expulsion” 
(Doubling 332). Thus Coetzee makes clear the notion that 
deception and self-deception remain haunting issues in 
discussions of apartheid censorship; discerning the truth 
remains a difficult task, and acknowledging the lures of self-
deception takes a constant effort.15 
Within this context it becomes easier to understand why 
Coetzee has chosen to write in his much criticized, ambiguous 
literary style during the heated era of apartheid politics. 
Durrant has stated that “[t]he dialectical movement of 
Adorno‟s thinking captures the agonistic position that Coetzee 
is forced to adopt. To create art seems blasphemous in the 
face of excessive suffering but, equally well, art may be the 
only means of remembering this suffering, of giving „suffering 
its own voice‟” (Postcolonial Narrative 29). The South African 
literary scene during the apartheid period was faced with 
similar issues to the ones confronting Sartre and Adorno 
during the aftermath of the Second World War—namely, what 
is the value of literary production in the face of brutal state 
violence? Many authors, encouraged by literary critics, 
followed Sartre‟s idea of committed art. Yet even if resistance 
literature was the paradigmatic mode of evaluating literary 
                                                 
15 Coetzee‟s problematization of the act of truth-telling remains in 
important relation to the particular political context in which he is 
writing. To remain truthful in such a situation means being open to self-
doubt; the attainment of truth is characterized as an inherently 
incomplete process that remains caught in the spiral movement of 
doubt. 
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value, some authors, like Coetzee, embraced a vision more 
closely aligned with Adorno‟s notion of autonomous art, which 
seeks to complicate the relationship between art and society 
by addressing the problem of establishing one‟s authority as a 
writer within the context of persistent state violence. From 
this perspective, authors who think they can wash their hands 
of the dilemma are deceived. Autonomous art—towards which 
Coetzee has taken his own aesthetic project—is not apolitical 
but rather sees the political struggle between the writer and 
the state from a more nuanced position.  
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